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Risk Management for Global Aging: 
Perspectives on the Challenges Facing Industrialized Countries 
 
By the Pension Research Council,  
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 Aging populations in the developed world will have a profound impact on the economy and 
society of those nations over the next half-century. Furthermore, the impact of population aging 
will be felt beyond national borders, presenting challenges throughout the globe.  The extent of 
the problems and prospects for globally-based solutions were taken up at the Wharton School 
during a recent series of discussions on “Risk Transfers and Retirement Income Security”. The 
event was co-sponsored by the Financial Services Forum and the Pension Research Council, 
with assistance from The Financial Institutions Center of The Wharton School of the University 
of Pennsylvania.1 
 
I. Implications of Global Aging  
George Vojta, President of the Financial Services Forum, believes that the events of 
September 11, 2001 indicate a strong potential for continued violence in a world marked by vast 
disparities in wealth.  To get emerging market economies on a path toward sustainable 
development, he contends, richer nations need to contribute not only direct aid but also foreign 
direct investment and encourage global trade. At the same time, industrialized countries face 
stresses related to the looming increases in their elderly population that will have seismic effects 
on Western economics. “What is coming to the fore now is a sense that considerable damage will 
                                                 
1  This material is intended for publication in a forthcoming volume from the Pension Research Council, The 
Pension Challenge: Risk Transfers and Retirement Income Security, edited by Olivia S. Mitchell and Kent Smetters; 
please refer to http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~prc/prc.html. 
  
2
be wrecked on the major economies of the world from the implications and consequences of 
global aging,” he states. “The equation for global prosperity is at risk.” 
Market Stresses to Come 
Maureen Culhane, senior member of the Strategic Relationship Management Group at 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., marshals data to show that populations of rich developed nations will 
decline and age, while poorer nations will account for most of the world’s future population 
growth. The impact will be felt in capital markets, in consumer products, and across all 
industries, including defense, she believes. “Global aging will change everything in the world.” 
In 1950, there were seven developed countries among the 12 most populous countries: 
the United States, Russia, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. But by 2050, 
United Nation forecasts show only the United States will remain on the list. The others will be 
displaced by Pakistan, Nigeria, Brazil, Congo, Ethiopia, Mexico and the Philippines. Culhane 
adds that the shift in population from rich countries to poorer nations will only heighten global 
resentments. “Whereas Europe, Japan, and the United State all have approximately the same per 
capita GDP, this list of other countries mostly weighs in with $800 per capita per year; 
furthermore, they can see us on the Internet and on TV.”  Europe made up 22 percent of the 
world’s population in 1950, but it is expected to account for only six percent in 2050 according 
to U.N. statistics. Japan’s three percent share in 1950 will drop to one percent in 2050, and North 
America will decline from seven percent to five percent. On the other hand, Latin American will 
grow from seven percent to nine percent. Asia is expected to increase from 52 percent in 1950 to 
57 percent in 2050. And Africa, which made up nine percent of the world’s population in 1950, 
is expected to account for 21 percent at mid-century. 
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Fertility rates are the main reason for the shift, notes Culhane, who states that birth rates 
typically decline as a population grows wealthier and women more highly educated. She points 
to U.N. figures that showed the fertility rate in Europe from 1960 to 1965 was 2.6. By contrast, it 
is now 1.3 with a projected increase to 1.8 in 2045 to 2050. The same current and future rates are 
estimated for Japan. The U.S. rate of 3.3 in 1960 to 1965 has dropped to 1.6 and is forecasted to 
rise to 1.9 in 40 years. Asia and Latin America now have rates of 2.5 and are forecasted to drop 
to 2.1 by 2045 to 2050. Africa with a current rate of 5.0 is expected to drop to 2.4 in 40 years. 
However, the up-tick projected for industrialized countries is suspect, according to Culhane. 
After a recent trip to Japan, she concluded that: “There is no one who believes it will happen. 
They believe it will decline even more. All these numbers are predicated on an upturn and if it 
does not happen everything gets worse.” 
Life expectancy has grown in the richer nations, in part by improvements in health care, 
adding to the aging equation. Japan is expected to lead the world with a life expectancy of 88 in 
40 years, with Europe, the United States, and Canada all expected to be over 80. As a percentage 
of population, Spain, Japan, and Italy are expected to have 35 percent of their populations over 
age 64 in 2050, with 12 percent over age 79. “People over age 79,” Culhane notes, “are 
expensive people.”  
Meanwhile, the working age population, which typically helps support retirees through 
government pension schemes, is expected to decline as a percent of population in many countries 
over the next half-century. There are now 4.5 workers supporting every retiree, but that will drop 
to 2.5 by 2050 according to U.N. forecasts. The support ratio in Japan will drop from 3.3 to 1.1, 
and from 3.4 to 1.1 in Spain. However, the rapidly aging populations still control the vast 
majority of the world’s wealth. “Follow the money,” she indicates, “and the money is all in the 
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western world.” In 1998, the United States had 46 percent of the world’s financial assets of $63 
trillion. Eight countries controlled 92 percent of the assets. “These are the guys who make the 
difference,” she argues: “Money makes money.” 
Economic growth and productivity are likely to slow with aging populations, she 
predicts. In Japan’s great industrialization period, GDP tripled in 30 years, Culhane points out.  
Now estimates are that Japan’s GDP will be just 35 percent higher in 2050. “With slow GDP 
growth, it is very difficult to stimulate economies,” says Culhane. She argues, that in most 
measures, the United States is better off than other aging Western nations, with a higher fertility 
rate and immigration of one million people a year. While productivity is one key to growth, she 
said, the other is adding people to the workforce. “Every one will be working longer because all 
these young people have to support all these old people. It’s a huge transfer of wealth, and if you 
have more wealth, it’s easier to transfer.” In many rich nations, elderly people have been 
promised rich retirement benefits. In Italy, retirees were promised 80 percent of their wages at 
retirement in 1999. Italy has had two reforms since, changing the guarantee so that in 15 years 
the benefit will be only 60 percent of wages. Similar reforms are being discussed in France, 
Germany and Spain. 
“These four countries have no funded pension plans,” points out Culhane. As of 1999, 
Germany had set aside just seven percent of GDP to cover private and public pensions; Italy had 
set aside six percent, France five percent, and Spain only two percent. In the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Canada, where there is a greater emphasis on private and defined-
contribution plans, Culhane finds that the situation is better, with a range from 54 percent of 
GDP in Canada to 95 percent in the United Kingdom, set aside. Beyond government programs, 
total household financial assets reached 380 percent of GDP in the United States in 1999, where 
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consumers have only a moderate amount of debt. But in Germany, she said, only 154 percent of 
GDP is held in financial assets. “That’s all they have, 1.5 years of GDP,” concluding that this 
will imply very high taxes. 
In France, things are worse, with pensions and other government outlays accounting for 
51.4 percent of every dollar of GDP, according to 2001 OECD statistics. Healthcare expenses for 
a 65-year-old are three to five times that of a person under 65, she notes. The concern is that high 
taxation to support government pension promises and other programs will eventually choke off 
global competitiveness. She argues that in Germany, workers are the most productive and 
expensive in the world, but they take home only 49 percent of their pay. Social security and 
other payroll taxes consume 34 percent of a German worker’s pay and income taxes another 17 
percent. “They’re taking home no money,” states Culhane. On a recent visit to Germany, she 
uncovered great concern about how the country would maintain employment. “No one is 
building operations in Germany,” she says. “No one.” 
Turning back to the capital markets, Culhane notes that funded pension assets have a 
strong correlation with a nation’s stock market capitalization as a percent of GDP, with 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and United States showing a better 
performance in funded assets. Norway, Brazil, Spain and Italy had lower stock market 
capitalization and fewer pension fund assets as a percent of GDP. As for asset allocation, the 
United States and the United Kingdom both had more than half their pension, insurance, and 
mutual fund assets in equities, followed by Canada with just under 40 percent in 1999. 
“Basically, no one else out there has much in equities,” she adds. Culhane forecasts pension 
assets held in equities will grow in Japan and Europe by 2010. For example, she predicts that 
Germany’s equity allocation for pension assets will grow from 22 percent to 47 percent, and 
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Spain’s will double from 22 percent to 44 percent. However, in her view, the United States has 
peaked at 56 percent in 1999, largely because of the fall-off in share prices that has already 
occurred. 
The Outlook for Aging Nations 
Paul S. Hewitt, Director of the Global Aging Initiative, is known for his rather 
pessimistic outlook for the world’s aging nations. However, he does offer some room for hope, 
arguing that globalization linking the economies of poor, growing nations with the developed 
countries creates new sources of money to fund the aging world’s retirement years. He recalls 
that he recently explained to the chief executive of Fiat that the United States will experience a 
20 percent decline in the number of people aged 25 to 45 in the next 20 years. The chief 
executive said he was less concerned about that, than the fact that half of Italian men under 30 
are unemployed. “The upshot,” said Hewitt, “is that Fiat will take its money out of Italy and it 
will move to where markets are growing.” “Hopefully,” he continues, “this is a good sign that 
capital is mobile and that capital will have high earnings. But there are potential bumps in the 
road.” 
Hewitt envisions two possible scenarios arising from the aging of the Western Industrial 
nations and Japan. The first he calls “The Aging Recession” scenario, in which the aging nations 
wind up resembling financially stricken Argentina.  In this view, a rising aged population and 
low birth rates lead to slow or declining economic growth. Against this political backdrop, 
however, it would be very difficult to raise taxes or cut benefits. That could lead to default, 
points out Hewitt. “There will be global capital shortages as everybody sticks a straw into the 
capital pools and sucks hard,” he continues. “There will be political instability because the Third 
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World won’t like the fact that old rich countries are using up all the capital they need for 
investment to be more productive.” 
The other scenario, which he calls “A New Global Era,” has a rosier outcome. In this 
vision, global dynamism shifts from Europe to China, for example, where rates of return on 
investment are high. At the same time, European countries adhere to the Maastricht Treaty and 
avoid piling on debt, and somehow the ailing Japanese economy stabilizes. “The developing 
countries become tremendously wonderful places to invest. We have a boom of cross-border 
trade, and everybody lives happily ever after,” opines Hewitt. 
Worldwide, just about every country is skewing older because of increases in life 
expectancy, Hewitt affirms. But the aging explosion is primarily a problem in the developed 
countries. China also is facing a boom in elderly and will have an older age structure than the 
United States by 2030, he notes. People over 65 made up only two to three percent of the 
population 100 years ago. “Today they make up 15 percent and that will grow to 30 percent by 
2050,” states Hewitt. “This is an ongoing problem,” he concludes. 
Hewitt also discusses the impact of aging and depopulation on financial markets, and he 
concludes: “Asset values will be at risk, particularly real estate assets.” The nature of investment 
will also reflect the aging population, he finds. “You’ll have pressure for higher spending, and 
pressure for protecting older, less efficient industries,” points out Hewitt. “Investment 
preferences will become more conservative, and as the overall investment environment becomes 
more conservative it will be less prone to generate spectacular breakthroughs.” 
Looking at demographic patterns over the next 30 years, he indicates: “It never gets any 
better.” In Italy, for example, there are now five people for every one over age 80. By 2050, 
there will be more people over 80 in Italy than under age 20. “No country has ever gone down 
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this road,” explains Hewitt. He cites OCED growth estimates that in 2025 European economic 
growth will average 0.5 percent a year compared with 1.4 percent in the United States and 0.6 
percent in Japan. “We aren’t used to living with very slow growth, but it could become a way of 
life,” believes Hewitt.  
There will also be financial effects as retirees spend down savings “if they have any.” 
Hewitt points out that 56 percent of Europeans have no savings and many Americans do not 
either. Fiscal pressure on governments will increase, citing a plan already in the works by the 
U.S. Social Security system to borrow $11 billion. “As we look ahead, even the most advantaged 
of the countries will have trouble,” warns Hewitt. If Japan’s shortfalls lead to default, European 
capital markets will suffer from contagion, with governments pressed to meet obligations to 
retirees. The ability to raise taxes is already limited, in his view, and dissaving will begin in 
earnest by 2015. 
Government spending projections do not fully account for what is to come, believes 
Hewitt. “Our estimate is that health and pension benefits are going to grow more rapidly in the 
future than many governments project,” he states.  For example, the Japanese government 
predicts there will be no increase in spending for long-term care going forward, said Hewitt. He 
projects that if all pension fund obligations were financed with debt, by 2030 they would soak up 
all of the world’s capital. The demographic shifts will also have implications for lifestyle, he 
said. For example, if aging countries try to keep the ratio of workers to retirees constant by 
increasing the age of retirement, the average person in France will be working until age 74. The 
typical retirement age in France today is 58. 
Globalization, argues Hewitt, must be a key resource for the aging industrial nations. 
“You can outsource your labor-intensive work to the developing countries and concentrate on 
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more highly compensated, higher productivity work,” he concludes. Immigration, he adds, could 
also help ease labor shortfalls. “The good news is that we can invest our pension funds in 
countries with low productivity and large labor forces. This infusion of capital might be able to 
generate large returns, which can be shared back. In this way, young people can still support old 
people over national borders.” Managing this transition will require significant change, 
particularly to existing entitlement programs. He feels that retirement funds must be more 
market-based and emphasize economic efficiency over job protection. “All of our social, trade, 
and investment policies are geared toward protecting employment,” states Hewitt, “but going 
forward the primary source of social crisis will be labor shortages.” 
Finally, Hewitt points out that aging societies need to retool their welfare states to 
encourage life-long productivity instead of workforce withdrawal. “It’s the global economy that 
will be either the savior or the bane,” Hewitt argues. “It’s going to require a lot of work in the 
developing world to take advantage of the potential capital flows that will be coming their way.” 
The Future of Retirement Income Security   
William G. Shipman, chairman of CarriageOaks Partners LLC and co-chairman of the 
Cato Project on Social Security Privatization, also puts a global twist on the implications of 
rapidly aging populations. “Retirement income security is one of the most important domestic 
issues any and all countries will face in the next 25 years or so,” states Shipman. He feels that 
most countries in the world provide some kind of income security for their elderly that is usually 
financed through specified payroll taxes. “It is terribly important to keep these payroll taxes at a 
reasonable level and that there be a lot of workers relative to beneficiaries,” he points out. “But 
birth rates are going down and there is a demographic squeeze that makes it more difficult to 
finance retirement plans through a payroll tax. This is what’s happening around the globe.” 
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Most governments have responded by raising taxes, because they view the issue as a 
cash-flow problem, Shipman believes. More recently, countries have gone from raising taxes to 
cutting benefits. But this too, he warns, takes a cash-flow approach, rather than addressing the 
underlying causes of the looming pension funding shortfalls. “Neither raising taxes nor cutting 
benefits has anything to do with, or influences either the birth rate or life expectancy,” indicates 
Shipman. “These are nothing more and nothing less than financial patches.” He feels that taxes 
are already at a point where politicians find it difficult to raise them any more. Raising taxes can 
also have the opposite of the desired effect if it creates economic shortfalls because taxpayers 
simply avoid paying taxes. In the last two to three years, political leaders have begun to look at 
alternatives, most importantly a shift from pay-as-you-go government financing to a market-
based system. 
“This raises a whole host of issues and objections,” says Shipman. First, there are 
concerns about liquidity and whether capital markets could handle the new volume. But Shipman 
believes that capital markets can easily handle the inflow. His analysis found it would add an 
additional six minutes a day to fill the orders. “So if we can handle all of this from a liquidity 
perspective, can we handle this from the point of view of administration?  How could we 
possibly go to a market-based structure in the United States with 140 million workers and do it 
in such a way that is cost effective?” he asks. “Many people have suggested you can’t do it. It’s 
too expensive.”  He says: “Let me suggest to you this problem is solvable.” 
In Shipman’s view, a three-level approach is required to remedy this situation. The first 
level would be a large, balanced, money-market fund, in which all investors would earn the same 
rate of return. These funds would be held in a stable dollar portfolio; after a year the portfolio 
would be unitized, and the investor would receive a certain number of shares. After some time, 
  
11
the funds could move to a second level, where workers could elect to invest in one of three 
funds. One would be comprised of an asset allocation similar to today’s major defined-benefit 
programs, more or less a 60-40 mix of equities and bonds. A second fund, for those willing to 
take more risk, would have an 80-20 stock-to-bond ratio. The third fund would be more 
conservative, weighted 50-50 between equities and fixed-income investments. “These 
investment choices might be seen as age specific,” notes Shipman. “If you know nothing about 
markets and finance, you do know something - you know your age. All you have to do is apply 
your age to the balanced fund setup.” After time passed and the portfolio grew, Shipman argued 
that an investor might move up a third level, in which retail money managers could offer to 
manage the investment. These investment firms, Shipman cautions, would still be constrained in 
their asset allocations to avoid moral hazard problems, but it would provide competition. 
In addition to this horizontal retail competition, Shipman also suggests that there must be 
competition between the second and third levels, allowing investors to switch back and forth. 
“With this horizontal and vertical competition you ensure the greatest number goods and 
services at the lowest cost,” states Shipman.  
Turning back to the issue of global aging, Shipman also suggests that globalization could 
play a critical role. He, too, points to the problem of rapidly aging populations in Europe and 
Japan. “Japan is aging at warp-speed,” he finds, adding that Japan’s population could be half its 
current size by the end of this century. “These are enormous challenges,” says Shipman. But at 
the same time, the world’s overall population is expected to increase 50 percent in the next half-
century. “So maybe what we’re going to see over the next 50 year or so is a reordering where 
there are extraordinary opportunities to sell products to an increasingly large population. It just 
may not be in the same places we normally go to,” finds Shipman. 
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He also cautions that population is not the only factor in new markets: “If that were the 
case, China would have been one of the greatest economic opportunities and Hong Kong would 
not have existed.” But before developing nations can attract capital and create attractive returns 
on it, they must undergo structural changes. These include a shift to the rule of law from the rule 
of man, better enforcement of contracts, and stable currencies and inflation. Emerging industrial 
countries, he states, must provide “an environment that is friendly to capital, not just an 
environment that has a lot of people.” “If countries that are growing in population move this 
way,” he argues, “the opportunities will be unprecedented. We will see movement globally from 
financing social services by taxing people, to financing social services from savings and 
investment.” In sum, he believes that “if that happens, and if it is done correctly, we may be 
entering not a difficult period rather we may be entering a global renaissance in which markets 
become much more important in achieving the objectives of humanity across the globe.” 
Forecasts Remain Uncertain 
Further discussion of these points finds Culhane acknowledging that despite her dire 
forecasts, individual per-capita income in Europe and other parts of the developed world will 
continue to grow. “It will depend on how many people work and productivity,” she states, “but 
in almost all cases, in the developed world, per capita income will continue to grow. Our 
children will be better off than we are. “The larger problem,” she concludes, “is the 
redistribution of wealth within per capital income.” In a country like France, where 50 cents of 
every dollar of GDP is spent by government, employees believe they are working mainly to 
support the elderly. Eventually, she concludes, the tax burden will discourage people from 
working. Add to that global competitiveness problems and a country can find itself in a “self-
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fulfilling” cycle of decline even with high per-capita income. “You will have high per-capita 
income but it will go from workers to non-workers,” states Culhane. 
Hewitt, too, stresses productivity and growth. He warns that the European population 
projections are probably not reliable, saying that it is an “open secret” in Europe that official 
projections indicate increased rather than declining labor force participation. “When one looks 
over the history of recessions, or slow growth, one finds it is accompanied by very low 
productivity growth,” he notes. “Productivity does not grow when opportunities are not 
expanding and where markets are shrinking. The big question is whether productivity will 
continue to grow.” As consumers age, he believes, demand will fall; whether capital will flow to 
riskier, but growing, markets overseas remains to be seen. “The big question for an aging society 
is, ‘Can old workforces that are less adaptable and less inclined to embrace change actually 
become more nimble?’ Everything will have to be geared toward increased productivity and 
that’s going to be a very difficult trick.” 
Hewitt thinks individuals will need to work later, recalling that today’s leisure-oriented 
retirement is a post-World War II phenomenon. “It was geared to dealing with the problem of 
unemployment which had been the root of social upheaval in Europe,” he concludes. During the 
Cold War retirement helped keep social peace by taking older people out of the workforce to 
make room for returning veterans. On the issue of protection for women in retirement, he states 
that the problem is that women tend to leave the workforce at least for some time after they have 
children, pushing down their retirement savings and entitlement through defined-benefit plans. 
“In Germany there are no married women with children in the labor force,” he indicates. “You 
make a make a choice, so culture matters, and in some cases it’s going to have to change fairly 
quickly.” 
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Culhane points out that women tend to live longer and, historically, have not had as much 
savings accumulated as men. “In countries without a high social security payment, like the U.S. 
and Canada, you do see women living less well,” she says. “In more socialistic countries that’s 
not the case.” 
Cross-National Perspectives 
Culhane believes that, in Germany, high taxes are discouraging investment. She recently 
met with officials at the Bundesbank who indicated that they fear it impossible to restructure the 
system, though had they stated that had they started reforms a decade ago, “we would have had a 
chance.” The crunch, when it comes at the end of this decade, will require them to cut benefits of 
people already retired. “This is going to be a serious problem,” concludes Culhane. She adds that 
when Japan recently tried to raise taxes to close budget gaps, consumption died off and with it 
economic growth and revenues from taxation. 
Raimond Maurer, a Professor of Investment, Portfolio Management and Pension Systems 
at Goethe University in Frankfurt, suggests that Culhane’s assessment of German 
competitiveness might be too negative. In his view, budget limitations can be attributed to the 
extraordinary opportunity to reunify Germany. In the long run, reunification will be a boon to 
Germany. “I’m not so pessimistic,” he concludes, noting the rush by U.S. investment banks to 
participate in German pension reforms. 
The apparent irony is that policy makers must now cope with aging and depopulation 
issues, whereas just a few years ago there was concern about overpopulation. “You still have 
problems with overpopulation in some countries,” he says. He points to Saudi Arabia, which had 
a population of 3.2 million in 1950. By 2050 Saudi Arabia’s population is projected to be 91 
million. Hewitt does believe there are some advantages to global aging. In Sri Lanka, for 
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example, the median age has risen to 30 and power seems to be transitioning from rebel bands to 
more mainstream political institutions. He also notes that during China’s bloody Cultural 
Revolution, the country’s median age was 18. “It’s like getting older personally: a little maturity 
is a good thing,” suggests Hewitt. 
Shipman finds that the apparent 180-degree turn on the nature of the population problem 
is typical in many public discourses. “There are always alarmists. It is a way of getting attention 
for their point of view,” he contends. “In most countries around the world, people have chosen to 
finance the needs of the elderly with a tax on the less elderly. That’s not necessarily alarming, 
but we’ve got to do something about it. That’s the great challenge countries face.” 
Culhane says that the combination of population decline in rich countries and 
overpopulation in developing nations adds to the difficulty of the global aging dilemma. “People 
are being born into $500 to $800 a year per capita lives, and at the same time the developed 
nations are shrinking,” she notes. “For everyone’s sake, there is a distribution issue that we’re 
facing. It’s not great to have all these children born into places where they will die and starve. 
That is the problem.” 
New Roles for Labor and Capital 
Enron aside, numerous studies have shown a link between company stock holdings and 
productivity, and many company stock plans have made their employees wealthy.  Shipman 
notes that Enron simply joins a long list of failed companies including Studebaker and the Bank 
of New England. “This is not a new issue. One reason Enron was brought to the fore is that there 
was hanky panky going on. The fastest way to stock market wealth is to own one stock,” says 
Shipman. “It is also the fastest way to get poor. That’s what diversification is about. People 
should not view markets in a poor light because a single stock failed.” 
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Robert Myers, former chief actuary for the U.S. Social Security Administration, 
questions whether these forecasts of the impact of aging might be somewhat overwrought. He 
suggests that researchers should take into account the likelihood of people working longer, and 
he challenges the notion that U.S. payroll taxes cannot be raised. Instead, he says, workers will 
continue to enjoy higher real earnings. “Part of those real earnings can be taken away for Social 
Security taxes with the worker still having more real income and enjoying higher standards of 
living,” argues Myers. 
Shipman concurs that many workers could stay on the job longer, “except for one ugly 
fact: there are expectations binding those working and those who want to retire with benefits 
rising as a function of age.” As to whether taxes could be raised, Shipman feels that they could 
“but what happens is there is a political backlash; at some point, people stand up and say, ‘I want 
to look at this in a different way.’ When they see this disconnect, they don’t want to raise the 
taxes further, they want to find a different solution.” 
Finally, on the question of the role of technology in labor markets and its impact on the 
aging crisis, the speakers appear unconcerned that automation might be “killing off” jobs that 
could help pay for future retirement benefits. Some have been asked: “What about shifting the 
reliance from human labor to a tax on technology transfer?” Shipman, speaking for the 
assembled group, finds that there could be any number of new approaches. “There are other 
models out there,” he said. “But what is clear is that there must be new sources of savings and 
investing to get needed economic growth.” 
 
II. Understanding Pension Risk Transfers 
During the global stock market boom of the 1990s, retirement savings began to shift into 
defined contribution plans, away from defined benefit plans. But the recent market downturn and 
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the highly publicized Enron collapse has breathed new life into the idea of adding guarantees to 
these new plans. The costs and benefits of pension risk transfers are the focus of ongoing 
research by Olivia S. Mitchell, executive director of the Pension Research Council and a 
Professor of Insurance and Rick Management at Wharton, and several other academics as well as 
practitioners. Mitchell served recently on President Bush’s Commission to Strengthen Social 
Security, and she notes that the commission did discuss guarantees thought it did not take a 
formal position. She concludes: “We all realized that we needed a lot more information about the 
costs and benefits of pension risk transfers.” 
International Pension Guarantees  
An analysis of retirement guarantees around the world to lend global perspective of the 
debate has been prepared by Jan Walliser, an economist in the African Department of the 
International Monetary Fund.  He finds that most mandatory public defined-contribution plans 
feature some form of guarantee. In some cases it is a flat benefit, independent of contributions, 
while in other cases it is “topped up” to provide a minimum benefit. Still others provide a 
guaranteed rate of return. He notes that pension guarantees are intended to protect retirees’ 
income and alleviate poverty, though they can be costly and introduce moral hazard into saving 
and investment decisions. The advantages of a flat benefit are clear: the costs are easy to project, 
based on simple demographic and economic assumptions. On the other hand, a poorly targeted 
flat benefit will result in costly payments to affluent members of the society. A guaranteed flat 
benefit can also distort portfolios, encouraging people to hold more risky assets. By offering a 
contingent minimum benefit, retirement systems can save on cost, but their true cost then 
becomes more difficult to calculate, leading budget authorities to underestimate potential 
liability. 
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Walliser suggests that governments must manage pension risk with tight monitoring and 
be prepared to aggressively seize assets if a risky situation develops. This may be difficult to do 
in the case of individual accounts, of course. Providing price guarantees for underlying risk is 
also difficult to do in a defined contribution context, he argues, because of the many different 
portfolios. Walliser finds three main models for retirement guarantees around the world. The 
British model is a two-tiered system with a flat benefit, and a second, optional tier, which 
permits a large variety of choices but limits the level to which government is ultimately liable for 
retiree pensions. Other countries with historic ties to Britain have similar systems. In Australia, 
the income guarantee is means-tested and financed out of general revenues. A difficulty with this 
approach is that retirees tend to spend their lump sums on real estate or assets that are not 
counted against eligibility. Singapore and Malaysia use provident funds in which retirement 
savings are pooled in a single large account with a government-guaranteed minimal return. This 
leads to conservative investment and poor returns. 
A second model, popular in Latin America, is one in which the government offers a 
guaranteed rate of return but also takes a portion from the upside gains. Yet a third approach is 
used by the transition economies of Eastern Europe, where an older population and larger labor 
markets led companies to maintain a larger pay-as-you-go financed pillar than in Latin America. 
In Hungary, for example, reformers supplanted the unfunded defined benefit system with a 
mandatory defined contribution pillar with a contribution rate of 6 percent. This will augment the 
defined benefit replacement rate of 50 percent after 40 years, according to Walliser’s research. 
Voluntary defined contribution plans too have been subject to various types of risk 
transfer, as explored by John Turner, Senior Policy Advisor in the Public Policy Institute at 
AARP and David Rajnes, a research associate with the Employee Benefit Research Institute. 
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They find that such rate of return guarantees can be nominal or indexed for inflation; some 
guarantees are fixed and others are linked to a particular rate or to a capital market index. A 
“point guarantee” is similar to a cash balance plan, in which the worker receives a specified rate 
of return and the sponsor keeps returns above the guarantee. With a minimum guarantee, the 
worker receives the entire rate of return above the guarantee. Guarantees can be structured to 
provide “catastrophic” protection at a low rate of return or they can be set high to provide rate-
of-return smoothing. This was used at Enron where executives received 12 percent returns. 
Guarantees can also be voluntary or mandatory, and they can account for the risk that the 
guarantee will be changed. The primary means of managing these risks is to hedge with 
insurance products or to develop a highly diversified portfolio. According to Turner, “hedging 
involves eliminating some of the risk but you give up some of the gain”. Institutions providing 
capital to back the guarantees can include the employers’ own operations or the defined-
contribution plan itself through associated reserve funds. 
Turner finds instructive the experience of countries with alternative types of pension 
guarantees in their voluntary defined contribution systems. For example, Brazil offers an “open” 
defined contribution plan that guarantees a real rate of return of six percent, with excess credited 
to workers’ accounts. The weakening of Brazilian financial markets has retarded this plan’s 
implementation, however. In Denmark, occupational funds have purchased insurance to 
underwrite guaranteed returns; in practice, however, the guaranteed set rate has decreased 
steadily from 4.5 percent in the early 1990s to 1.5 percent in 2001. Germany has capital 
guarantees, and in some industries, supplemental plans offer returns in the 3.5 percent range. 
New Zealand has changed the rate guaranteed in its provident funds for local government 
employees from four percent a year to four percent cumulative from the date of entry into the 
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plan. There are interesting plans in the United Kingdom that offer a combination approach to 
benefits, in which the worker receives whichever is higher, the defined-benefit or defined-
contribution payout. 
In the United States, pension law restricts the structure of plans, although non-profits 
have considerably more freedom. Turner and Rajnes evaluate the United Methodist Church and 
YMCA plans where a board supervises reserve funds and each year determines the guarantee for 
the following year. The Methodist plan has reduced its guarantee from 6.5 percent in the 1990s 
to 3.5 percent in 2001. Other U.S. defined contribution plans covering government workers have 
plans that are linked to defined-benefit guarantees, though few voluntary defined contribution 
plans offer no guarantees. Looking ahead, Rajnes argues that rate-of-return guarantees will be 
central to future policy debates on pension reform.  
Of course, investment performance during working years is only one of several risks in a 
defined contribution plan, states Judy Weiss, executive vice-president at MetLife in charge of 
Retirement and Savings in Institutional Business.  Others include longevity risks and the 
prospect that inflation will erode the purchasing power of diligent savers. While the approach 
used by the Methodist Church and the YMCA is not allowed under ERISA, portfolio smoothing 
can be simulated with insurance products. She also predicts that the popularity of inflation-linked 
plans will fluctuate over time, saying: “I expect to see their popularity wax and wane as inflation 
goes up and down.” Nominal guarantees, she points out, require more capital than relative 
guarantees, and relative guarantees are of more value to individuals. “Financial well-being is 
largely a relative measure,” she notes, while agreeing that governments must understand upfront 
the cost of guarantees and their potential impact on behavioral risk. Weiss also endorses new and 
expanded public education, not only on saving for retirement, but also on how defined 
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contribution funds should be spent during retirement. As retirees draw down savings, they are 
likely to spend a greater share on services than on goods, but services historically, are more 
prone to inflation. “An adequate single measure of inflation might be more difficult to determine 
because the cost of goods may not inflate nearly as much as services,” she notes. “This means 
retirees will be needing these services just when the funds are depleted the most.” 
 Zvi Bodie, Professor of Finance at Boston University School of Management, suggests 
that policymakers must distinguish between two types of guarantees: one that guarantees against 
market risk, and another that guarantees against default risk. The market-risk guarantee would be 
more relevant for defined-contribution plans, he believes. The other guarantee would be similar 
to the type of guarantee provided by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., which protects 
beneficiaries of corporate defined-benefit plans.  Others, including Kent Smetters, assistant 
professor of Risk Management at the Wharton School, worries that defined benefit plans have a 
mechanism to spread intergenerational risk, while individual defined contribution plans cannot 
be structured to pass through that risk. He feels that pricing guarantees becomes difficult, 
particularly in a political context. Projections could be made on a risk-adjusted basis, but it 
would generate a long list of numbers and almost all of them would turn out to be wrong. As 
Smetters argues, “Go to a policymaker and tell them that all those numbers are wrong and 
they’re going to say, ‘What’s wrong with you?’ The politics tend to be gravitating toward getting 
the “right” number, rather than doing it in a risk-adjusted way.” 
Weiss is wary of guarantees that could result in  “closet” indexing by plan providers and 
ultimately drive down returns. She suggests that any guarantee should be developed in an 
environment where providers vie to become approved investment managers. “You would find 
many players wanting to gain market share, who would take risks, so they might have a chance 
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to make a name for themselves,” says Weiss. She also endorses annuities as a solution to 
longevity risk. “The risks don’t end when you retire and get your check. You have to look at it in 
the retirement context as well.” While focusing on rate-of-return guarantees might be helpful, 
she argues that the payout stage is also critical to the welfare of beneficiaries. 
 
III. Designing Robust Pension Promises 
The global move toward reform of pension systems has taken an interesting turn over the 
past few years as it shifted from a debate over pay-as-you-go versus funded schemes, to a more 
nuanced discussion.  
International Pension Reform Movement  
Increasingly, countries are moving toward the notion of a first layer of publicly funded 
security and another layer that is privately funded and managed. While exploring risk 
management in pensions, one must not overlook problems with government-managed pension 
reserves, a point underscored by Robert Palacios, senior pension economist in the Social 
Protection Unit of the World Bank. He finds that, when examining risks associated with public 
defaults, it is necessary to separate sponsor risk and market-based risk. Government pension 
schemes around the world have a poor record of managing reserves, according to Palacios. These 
problems can stem from failure in a number of areas including governance, pre-funding 
objectives, investment policy and processes, reporting and disclosure. “Doing one or two 
correctly is not enough,” he states, “and one done badly could easily bring down the rest.” 
Palacios explores aspects of recent reform initiatives in Canada, Ireland, Japan, New 
Zealand, and Sweden, believing that these offer lessons on how countries can pre-fund 
retirement accounts and minimize the risk of political interference, which has historically been 
the root of poor investment returns in government plans.  Japan and Sweden had significant 
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reserves with low returns, but in these countries the funds were used for other public policy 
objectives. In Japan, they were used to fund the nation’s so-called “second budget” of economic 
incentives; in Sweden, for mortgage lending. In New Zealand, the Green Party has forced ethical 
investment principles. Palacios proposes that nations must be mindful of such specific conditions 
when designing a plan. He also notes that each of the five countries arrived at the pre-funding 
option after rejecting the idea of private individual-account systems, primarily over concerns 
about administrative costs. Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand have professional boards 
overseeing the funds, which is not commonly seen in government plans. Canada and New 
Zealand use a two-step nominating process removing the finance minister by at least one step. 
Japan still has strong ties to top levels of government, but control has recently been switched 
from the Finance Ministry to the Ministry of Health and Welfare. All require external audits and 
allow external management of a portion of the accounts. The five countries studied also apply 
objective monitoring criteria, use benchmarks and, except for Japan, specify that commercial 
investment must be made. 
Palacios has developed an index of accountability for 65 countries and the five countries 
with the new initiatives appeared near the top, with Japan ranking the lowest at only 13. Greater 
accountability is crucial to the long-term sustainability of a national pension scheme, says 
Palacios. However, he cautions that it will take time to see if these examples take hold and he 
said many countries do not have the conditions that make these reforms possible, such as open 
foreign exchange. He says a compromise hybrid solution might be to create a default central 
fund with an opt-out possibility that could require a shift to a defined-contribution scheme for 
pre-funding. That might eliminate the problem of partial pre-funding. “Ultimately the reliance is 
on the public to lead the board to accountability,” he concludes. 
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Pensions in the Public Sector 
Risk management for pensions in the public sector argued is often inherently biased 
against future taxpayers, according to Jeremy Gold, from of New York-based Jeremy Gold 
Pensions. He objects to the use of actuarial techniques arriving at the “expected” return on plan 
assets, preferring instead an arbitrage approach. His work shows that using an expected rate 
shortchanges future generations of taxpayers, by failing to consider the cost of uncertainty in 
investment markets. Gold explains that first-generation taxpayers might pay 95 cents for every 
$1 of guarantee if they buy safe treasury bonds. But an actuary could argue that the liability 
should be only 91 cents based on expected returns based, for example, on the S&P 500 index. 
The next generation then pays 91 cents, but in effect it has lost four cents between the safe and 
the expected rates. The gap continues through succeeding generations of taxpayers. Understating 
liabilities, Gold said, leads governments to make other bad decisions, including poorly 
negotiated wage and pension contracts, skim funds and the use of costly Pension Obligation 
Bonds.  
He likewise criticizes Actuarial Standards Practice No. 27, adopted by actuaries in 1996, 
because it changed the way actuaries looked at economic assumptions of pension obligations. 
These changes seemed appropriate in a rising stock markets, but now that markets have declined, 
defined benefit pension funds have been caught short. He does caution that his arbitrage-based 
argument may be difficult to apply to large national systems such as Social Security where other 
forces may bring equilibrium. Gold noted that in 2005 corporations will be required to make fair-
market accounting of pension liabilities, but he said public pensions are likely to do the same 
“approximately when hell freezes over.” But the change in corporate accounting may have an 
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impact on the public sector, argues Gold. “People will demand more transparency, and when 
they do, I look for the impact of bad public policy on municipal debt or on housing prices.” 
Evaluating Guarantee Costs 
Guarantees do not come without cost, stresses Marie-Eve Lachance and Olivia Mitchell, 
from the Insurance and Risk Management Department at The Wharton School. Their research 
lays out six lessons related to guarantees of individual accounts. The first lesson is that benefits 
have an economic cost, and that the cost is often underestimated. The second lesson is that the 
design of a guarantee matters greatly. Plan sponsors much first decide how generous they want 
to be. While guarantees can be extremely expensive, even a cautious approach can come up 
short. A third lesson is that because of market volatility, a long investment horizon does not 
necessarily mean that guarantees will come cheaper. One must not look at this issue by using 
annualized returns; rather compound returns, which are subject to greater volatility, are the more 
valid measure. Lesson four is that investment must be restricted by weights in asset classes to 
prevent moral hazard problems. “If participants have a floor they will have more stock,” 
Lachance says. “If the stock market turns down, they will get the same amount. If there’s an 
incentive to hold more stocks, the higher will be the cost of the guarantee.” 
Lesson five from this work is that pension plan designers must clearly define who pays 
for the guarantee: it could be self-financing, or pay-as-you-go. In a self-financing plan, 
participants would pay a premium for an optional guarantee. The drawback is that some 
participants may not be able to afford this. The other alternative is to finance guarantees through 
taxes, but this shifts costs to future generations. Finally, individual account guarantees differ 
from insurance and cannot be protected through diversification over time. This can lead to the 
need to pay out claims all at once, or not at all: “Either the premiums are insufficient or you can 
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have a big pot money doing nothing,” says Lachance. An alternative strategy, would be to 
purchase derivatives with premiums. “The only tricky part here,” she points out, “is to make sure 
capital markets can provide such products.” 
European Advances 
Research by Raimond Maurer, Professor of Investment, Portfolio Management and 
Pension Systems at Goethe University in Frankfurt, illustrates that Germany faces the same 
demographic problems as much of the Western world, in which increasing numbers of aged as 
being supported by a shrinking number of younger workers. To cope with the looming shortfalls, 
the government enacted reforms in 2001, with an aim to stabilize taxes for pension costs which 
command more than 19 percent of salary at present. The maximum pension benefit was cut from 
70 percent of average net salary during the retiree’s working life, to 67 percent by 2030. The 
German system combines compulsory participation in the state plan with the opportunity to 
invest some pretax salary into a voluntary individual account with tax incentives. Individuals are 
free to make pension investments in a range of regulated products provided by financial 
institutions such as banks, mutual funds or life insurance companies, but they cannot use the 
funds to invest directly in stock, bonds, or real estate. 
 According to Maurer, the government is trying to encourage competition to bring down 
the expenses and encourage innovative new products. The government is also attempting to 
make sure individuals use the savings only for income in their post-retirement years and prevent 
investors from making what he called “too bad” investment decisions. A key feature is the 
system’s money guarantee in which plan providers must promise investors will get back at least 
what they put into the system. The plan providers make the promise, not the government, 
stresses Maurer. “The money-back guarantee represents a fixed liability,” he states. “If at 
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retirement the cash value of the policy is less then the provider has to fill the gap, if he is not 
insolvent.” 
The German government has strong banking and insurance industry supervision, 
requiring solvency capital for plan providers.  For the insurance providers and commercial banks 
that was a problem, because they must work within a fixed interest rate (usually higher than 
seven percent). The problem was even more difficult for the mutual fund industry, which 
assumes no obligation to produce guaranteed returns beyond reasonable and prudent 
management. The German solution is to free mutual funds of capital requirements as long as 
returns are within a band comparable to, or above, zero-risk bonds. “If the cash value of a mutual 
fund is higher than this critical line, then there is no risk and if there is no risk, there is no need 
for equity capital,” argues Maurer, who adds that it took considerable time to convince 
conservative government lawyers and banking regulators to go along with this plan. To avoid 
default, Maurer enumerates several ways that providers of individual account plans produce the 
money-back guarantee, including self-financing, investment in zero bonds, lifecycle models, and 
portfolio insurance strategy. He says that risk transfer and reinsurance are another possibility, 
though reinsurance is not popular at the moment. The economic costs of the guarantee, he 
believes is reduced upside potential because of asset-allocation requirements and the additional 
costs of supervising the risk-management system. 
Other Country Experiences 
John Piggott, Professor of Economics at the University of New South Wales in Australia, 
points out that defined contribution systems expose individuals to investment and inflation risk, 
so governments usually combine them with some form of annuity payout.  His research 
examines five kinds of annuities: level life annuities, which guarantee a nominal payment over a 
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lifetime but no protection against inflation; variable annuities which include investment risk 
based on an assumed investment return; inflation-indexed annuities which protect against 
expected inflation; term annuities which guarantee payment for a specific period only; and 
phased withdrawals within a range depending on life expectancy. His work shows that the 
variable annuity would be preferred, particularly by individuals with lower accumulations. His 
research also implies that inflation-insured annuities products will be popular as the population 
ages, particularly among wealthier retirees and those with strong aversion to risk. 
According to Scott Macey, Senior Vice President and Director of Government Affairs at 
AON, the initial challenge in developing pension guarantees is to decide whether to fund them or 
not. “We need to focus the public policy debate on financing, before we get to the important 
discussion about the allocation and underwriting of risk,” he states. The biggest risk facing the 
defined-contribution model is how to deal with cohort longevity risk, in his view: “This is the 
risk that people outlive their invested assets. I haven’t seen private sector solutions to deal with 
that.” Macey is also concerned with the issue of retiree health insurance, which goes hand-in-
hand with retirement income security. Companies are seeking to limit exposure to retiree health 
benefits, and Medicare is having difficulty keeping pace with costs, mainly because it does not 
offer a pharmaceutical benefit.  Finally, he is concerned that, at least in the United States, people 
are not saving enough. “They are too optimistic about what their likely returns will be over the 
long-haul in an individual account scheme, and they may not be saving enough because they 
overestimate what their returns will be.” 
 
IV. Pension Asset Allocation Issues 
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The collapse of Enron has focused attention on the risk exposure of employees who make 
company stock part of their 401 (k) plans. It further raises the question of how plan sponsors 
should construct pension investment choices.  
Pension Investment Choices 
Zvi Bodie, Professor of Finance at Boston University School of Management, argues that 
the investment industry carries a strong bias toward investing in the stock market.  He challenges 
the financial planning notion that stocks make the best investment over a long time horizon. Two 
different statements are often heard in the investment arena: “The longer you have until 
retirement, the more heavily your household should be invested in equities,” and “The longer 
you plan to hold equities, the less risky equities are.” The first statement implies that that “if 
you’re younger, you can tolerate greater risk,” says Bodie. “In the second case you are saying 
equities are actually less risky.” The second statement implies that regardless of one’s tolerance 
for risk, there is something inherent in the long-term horizon that makes equities less risky for 
everyone. This, he believes, is wrong. 
Conventional wisdom offered by financial planning websites and other sources of 
consumer advice stress a diversified portfolio, and they imply that longer time horizons dictate 
that a greater portion of the portfolio should be in equities.  But, says Bodie “the conventional 
advice has a pro-equity bias and is logically flawed.”  Economic theory shows no connection 
between a person’s time horizon and risk tolerance. Hedging, rather than diversification, is the 
best way to manage risk over time: “diversification works cross-sectionally at a point in time, but 
it does not reduce risk over time. There is no such thing as time diversification.” With the shift to 
individual management of defined contribution plans, the investment industry needs to develop 
more user-friendly menus with fewer investment choices. He appeals to 401 (k) plan sponsors to 
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provide the opportunity to invest in inflation-adjusted treasury bonds, which became available in 
1997. These bonds allow investors to earn an inflation-protected return of 3.4 percent over the 
next 30 years, but they have not been widely marketed to date. “There’s a lot of talk going on 
now in policy circles in Congress about how to improve the risk reduction possibilities open to 
people in the wake of Enron and similar problems,” he states. “The lack of attention paid to 
inflation-protected bonds strikes me as an incredible failure of public policy.” 
An alternative perspective is offered by Jeremy Siegel, Professor of Finance at The 
Wharton School. He believes that stocks are a better investment over a long period, relative to a 
random walk scenario, but he concedes they do not become absolutely safer. Also he contends 
that risk tolerance is linked to labor income, so younger people can work longer if they invest in 
equities that go bad. He suggests that retirement program managers should ask participants 
directly: “If we put you in stocks and stocks do badly, would you be willing to delay your 
retirement and work harder? If they say, ‘Yes’ that would imply higher equities.” Yet Siegel 
questions whether people would really be able to answer that question. “Often we say one thing, 
but when it comes to that time 10 or 20 years out, we could change our minds.” He also stresses 
that the sequencing of equity returns can be crucial in whether an investor has enough money to 
retire. Even if stocks outperform bonds in 95 percent of every 20-year period, bad returns at the 
beginning of an individual’s retirement years could mean the investor runs out of money. 
Turning to portfolio allocation issues, Siegel too, likes the inflation-adjusted treasury 
bonds, which he believes are beginning to gain a following. “Nominal bonds are far from risk-
free,” says Siegel. “Over 30 years, the real return risk on standard nominal bonds has been as 
high if not higher than the risk on a standard diversified portfolio.” Now Siegel believes the 
premium for investment in equities is now about two to three percent. With tax-adjusted bonds 
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returning 3.5 percent, he estimates a real return on equities of five to six percent going forward. 
“This it is far less than what we’ve enjoyed in the past, but certainly it is positive,” he concludes. 
“The premium is lower because price-to-earnings ratios are higher and deserve to remain higher” 
he says. He disagrees with some market forecaster who forecast a decline in the ratios to around 
14. “My feeling is stocks should earn five percent or so,” says Siegel. 
The Role of Company Stock in DC Plans 
The debate over employee ownership of company stock in 401 (k) plans has prompted an 
analysis of the risk that company stock creates in a portfolio. Krishna Ramaswamy, Edward 
Hopkinson, Jr. Professor of Investment Banking and a Professor of Finance at The Wharton 
School, says that larger companies are the ones that make their contributions to defined 
contribution plans in company stock. He cites research showing that only three percent of plans 
offer company stock, but 42 percent of all participants and 59 percent of all defined-contribution 
assets are covered by these plans. Some plans make it very attractive for participants to allocate 
company stock to their defined contribution funds. For example, he discusses a complicated 
defined contribution sign-up form that has company stock as the first option, followed by the 
appealing phrase: “If you entered 100% stop, and go to the end! You’re done!” It turns out there 
are “self-inflicted wounds,” says Ramaswamy. “Participants actively engage in putting 
additional money in company stock.” Ramaswamy acknowledges that his research takes into 
account only the diversification of the individuals’ 401 (k) assets, and it does not take into 
consideration whether employees have other diversified investments. 
While there is no agreed-upon measure of proper diversification, Ramaswamy’s 
analysis shows that employees with 30 percent of their defined contribution assets in company 
stock have an efficiency measure of only 64 percent. At a contribution level of 50 percent, the 
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efficiency measurement drops to 39 percent. By comparison, defined benefit plans are restricted 
to holding no more than 10 percent of other assets in company stock. At that level, the efficiency 
measure for average risk is in the 90 percent range. To put a dollar figure on these inefficiency 
costs, the professor uses an exchange option formula against different time frames. Ramaswamy 
finds that it would cost $178, or 17.8 percent, to purchase insurance against the risk of the 
company-stock for every $1,000 in portfolio for a period of one year. For three years, the amount 
would rise to $303, or 30.3 percent. “It should frighten people to think that if they want to insure 
$1,000 in company stock with an equal $1,000 in the S&P index, they have to give up 17 
percent,” he notes. “That’s overpaying for something you don’t need.”  
Stephen P. Utkus, a Principal at The Vanguard Group, leads the research in the 
company’s participant education department. He believes that the issue of volatility is often 
related to forecasts of stock-price appreciation. Volatility is often usually dismissed as a 
technical issue for the company treasurer, but a discussion of appreciation involves the top levels 
of the company. He believes that Ramaswamy’s index could help diffuse this touchy discussion 
saying: “It isolates people from the question of return and gets to a more dispassionate question, 
which is volatility.” He notes, “In the media there seems to be a belief that $1 worth of stock is 
worth $1 in cash.” “The academics, of course, don’t believe it, but practically everyone else 
does.” On-going debate asks whether a change in U.S. law restricting on defined contribution 
assets held in company stock would simply reduce company matching.  “The assumption is that 
employers would replace $1 worth of stock by a smaller cash contribution and workers would be 
worse off,” says Utkus. “The research response from the academic world is “not necessarily.” A 
dollar of stock is worth a lot less, depending on the volatility of the stock, than cash.” 
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A research study by Utkus and Olivia Mitchell show that other factors to consider in any 
debate over company stock are risk preferences and how much in total employees have exposed 
to company stock, perhaps in the form of options or other compensation.  On-going discussion is 
focusing on what Utkus calls the “Hurricane Andrew Problem”, which can arise when key 
market-makers expose themselves to systemic risk errors. One example was Florida’s East 
Coast, which began developing rapidly in the 1950s, continuing through the 1970s with few 
severe hurricanes. Over time, notes Utkus, “the probability of a hurricane fell -- until it 
occurred.” Similarly, “in December of 2000, market makers would have been happy to make a 
very low-cost insurance product for the 401 (k) investors at Enron. A year later, probably not.”  
This raises the important issue of the advice that defined contribution plan participants 
receive. Bodie contends that participants should consider the degree to which their future 
earnings are exposed to stock-market risk, regardless of what firm they work for. “The Enron 
case has raised the issue of lack of diversification in investing in your own company’s stock.  
Let’s say you’re a stock broker or anyone whose future earnings are tied to financial services: 
your future income is very much like an investment in the stock market. You are already heavily 
invested in the stock market. Do you really want your defined-contribution pension fund to be 
invested in the stock market also?” In his analysis of financial planning advice engines, this 
broader issue is never raised. According to Michael S. Gordon, a lawyer who helped draft the 
ERISA pension laws, “you have people who are possessed with a quasi-religious belief in 
company stock. You can no more deal with that in an academic way as you can with the 
problems in the Middle East today.” 
By contrast, Lisa Muelbroek, associate professor of finance at the Graduate School of 
Business at Harvard University questions whether the link between employee stock ownership 
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and economic performance is overstated. Concentration may be a problem for top managers, but 
rank-and-file employees tend to have only a small impact on corporate performance, regardless 
of their equity stake. 
Bodie remains concerned about individuals’ ability to manage this crucial task.  “We are 
now in a very strange situation where government has retreated, and other institutions have 
retreated, from their active participation in various aspects of the economy,” he contends. 
Though he considers himself a free-market oriented economist, he believes government should 
play a bigger role in helping people with the complexities of managing their retirement 
portfolios. “What do ordinary people know about that?” he queries. “It’s like asking people to 
perform surgery on themselves, as a solution to the problem of medical-cost inflation. It’s nuts, 
as far as I’m concerned.” 
 
V. Market Potential for Pension Securitization  
If pension plans do propose to provide guarantees, a number of possible financial 
vehicles may be explained and evaluated.  
New Financial Products  
New research by David Cummins, Harry J. Loman Professor of Insurance and Risk 
Management at the Wharton School, and Christopher Lewis, from Fitch Risk Management, 
suggests how new derivative securities can be created based on non-traditional assets, to help 
institutional investors enhance their portfolios.  Such asset-backed securities could offer 
investors the opportunity to further diversify and, at least for now, provide a premium because 
they are still novel. These securities will spread, the authors believe, extrapolating from the 
popularity of mortgage-backed securities which for 20 years have allowed investors to 
participate broadly in the housing market. The authors recognize that one drawback to using 
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these new types of bonds is that they are still unfamiliar and complex. Pricing is difficult because 
many of these securities are linked to low-frequency, but high-severity, events.  
Sponsors can use such securities to enhance credit quality, by moving risk off their 
balance sheets and gaining greater access to capital markets. They can also help meet regulatory 
requirements for risk-based capital and accounting requirements. The largest segment of the 
market now is mortgage-backed securities, with $140 billion in new issues in 2001. But 
Cummins says that market derivatives are developing based on auto loans, home equity loans, 
and equipment leases. “Right now there’s some very attractive investment opportunities for 
people who know what’s going on,” notes Cummins. Many non-traditional asset-backed 
securities are linked to credit, but newer forms are being linked to insurance. Weather-related 
bonds, for example, allow natural gas companies to hedge their risk against unusually warm 
winters. Other new securities include airline equipment leases and stranded costs of deregulated 
public utilities. 
An advantage to investors is that these products allow them to gain exposure to a market 
impossible to enter otherwise. For example, they allow non-banks to gain exposure to bank loan 
credit risk, without being a bank. Yet Cummins cautions that these securities are only for 
sophisticated institutions.  A major risk is information asymmetry: underwriting any credit risk 
requires significant knowledge and experience in the underlying reference credits. These 
products can also generate moral hazard problems and adverse selection. Yet the yields are 
attractive: catastrophic bonds yield 3.24 percent, energy weather derivatives are at 4.52 percent, 
and Japanese earthquake 2.72 percent. “We think these offer significant advantages,” said 
Cummins. “But go slow and make sure you know how to price them before going full speed.” 
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Canadian Experiences 
The Canadian experience with segregated fund guarantees is also relevant, according to 
Heath Windcliff, from the University of Waterloo’s Department of Computer Science. Using a 
mathematical approach to valuing and hedging exotic derivatives, he shows that segregated 
funds are similar to mutual funds but are bundled with long-term maturity of around 10 years 
and also pay a death benefit. They also typically have reset features so investors can lock in 
market gains. These funds initially took off in Canada while equity markets were rising. “It was 
a way to sell equity products to risk-averse people,” Windcliff comments. Unfortunately, there 
were problems with consumers lapsing on the funds and they carried a typical fee of between 40 
to 80 basis points on a pay-as-you-go basis. His research indicates that in the early years, the 
products were profitable because customers lapsed and fund sponsors pocketed the fees. “But in 
year 10 we started to see trouble with the put options coming due,” he notes.  Also, Canadian 
regulatory authorities were concerned and slapped capital requirements on the funds. Another 
obstacle was that there was no way to hedge against a market downturn except shorting stocks 
under the management of the fund, a practice frowned upon by regulators and investors. In the 
end, he said, it proved very expensive to hedge the funds given the strict regulations imposed. 
Though the products ultimately were unsuccessful, some of their design features could be used in 
structuring future individual account guarantees.   
Securitizing Survival 
Nontraditional securities are also potentially viable for the pension decumulation phase, 
according to Arthur Fliegelman, vice president-senior credit officer in the Financial Institutions 
Group of Moody’s Investors Services. “We at Moody’s see a significant opportunity for 
insurance companies in the annuity market,” he argues, believing that demand will be driven by 
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the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans and growing concern over the 
stability of the Social Security system. The baby boom generation represents “huge untapped 
market potential,” and insurers will have this market all to themselves. His work points out 
payout annuities offer longevity insurance to beneficiaries, which cannot be duplicated by 
systematic asset withdrawal. Insurance providers are protected from shortfalls by the law of large 
numbers and due to the long-term nature of the liabilities. However, insurance companies do 
face asset and equity-market risk, as well as longevity risk if people live longer. In addition to 
asset and longevity risk, Fliegelman said insurers also face risk in their own sales practices 
because these products are easy to misunderstand by both consumers and salespeople. 
While longevity risk can be overcome by a large pool of beneficiaries, long-term trends 
in mortality are difficult to predict. He has constructed models showing different scenarios 
including discovery of a cure for stroke and pneumonia that left companies in the black. But cure 
cancer, diabetes, and heart disease, and insurers will lose money. “If they lose enough money 
over time it becomes a major problem,” Fliegelman notes. 
Product design, he says, is critical. He said insurers need to diversify life risk and annuity 
products and must carefully consider age and selection issues. Reinsurance, he said, is not 
practical in the life insurance industry. One new product is the variable immediate annuity, in 
which payouts respond to the performance of an underlying investment pool, including equities. 
Performance is linked to an assumed interest rate, so income streams will increase over time if 
the investment performance is satisfactory. Long-term care coverage is also becoming more 
popular, along with products that bundle mortality risk with long-term care risk. The concept is 
you are dead or you’re sick. You can’t be both,” he remarks. “A lot of it is getting people 
sensitive to that and being able to market these products economically and efficiently.” Of 
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course there are regulatory and structural problems with developing securitized mortality 
instruments.  
“It’s a puzzle to me why life is not more securitized,” argues Cummins. “It seems more 
natural than catastrophic risk because basically it is a financial product and with prudent hedging 
you could deal with the mortality risk.” On the other hand, John Kalamarides, senior vice 
president of Marketing and Product Development at CIGNA, offers an insurance perspective on 
such financial vehicles. He agrees there are advantages to the non-traditional asset-backed 
securities, but feels that the issue of information asymmetry will prevent most institutions from 
adopting them. The market for these products will not take off without development of a 
secondary market, better understanding of significant but infrequent events, and the creation of a 
trusted agency or consultancy to provide oversight. “Non-traditional asset-backed securities 
heighten the anxiety in an environment already concerned about fiduciary and market risk,” he 
points out. Though hedging can increase annualized return on capital, the segregated funds 
products used in Canada would be too expensive to offer. “Finding a correlated asset to the 
underlying mutual fund is very expensive,” he says. “The volatile markets and real liquidity risk 
require daily or frequent hedging.” 
 While agreeing that annuities offer a great opportunity for insurers, he feels that 
mortality risk, particularly following the Human Genome Project, along with investment risk, are 
remaining concerns. The average U.S. 401 (k) plan has a median value of about $15,000 and no 
annuity is going to address the obvious saving shortfall. “If we’re going to develop that product 
and sell it, finding participants is important.” Furthermore, some scientists predict that life could 
be extended to 130 years, so workers will not be able to retire at 65. He envisions people 
working longer with a series of sabbaticals and multiple careers. The worrisome issue is that 
  
39
today, 70 percent of the population is uninvolved in retirement planning.  Employers must 
therefore become more active in educating employees about retirement. Though employees trust 
their employers more than government to supply retirement-planning advice, employers often do 
not want to take on the added responsibility. “Ultimately, the employee has control and 
responsibility for retirement planning,” he concludes. “Historically, control and responsibility 
have been dependent on the employer and the government. With defined contribution plans, 
we’ve shifted to the individual.” This explains the drive to afford risk to insurers. The irony for 
retirement systems, according to Kalamarides, is that “individuals want control but they don’t 
want responsibility.”  
